Abstract
The paper describes the geometrical structure of Nash equilibrium sets in partially convex games without constraints. A condition characterizing a distinct class of Nash equilibrium sets is given. A complete description of such sets in two dimensions as well as some pictures illustrating the appearing difficulties are presented.
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Suggested citation
Published by Heldermann Verlag, 1997. Rights now held by Banach Press LLC.
