Abstract

Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players' repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization and differential equations, the purpose being to render equilibrium both plausible and stable.

Author information

Contact details are reproduced from the original publication and may be historical.

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Dept. of Economics, University of Bergen, 5008 Bergen, Norway
and: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration

sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no

Keywords

  • Noncooperative games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • repeated play
  • differential equations
  • stability

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Suggested citation

S. D. Flåm. “Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games.” Journal of Convex Analysis 9 (2002), No. 2, 429–438. https://doi.org/10.68381/jca09025

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Published by Heldermann Verlag, 2002. Rights now held by Banach Press LLC.