Yuntong Wang
Abstract
The subgradients of a convex game at a given coalition of agents are defined. Given a public good economy, a convex game called public good game is generated. However, not all convex games are public good games. This paper uses subgradients to identify certain classes of public good games. In particular, we find a class of public good games which is a strict subset of convex games and a strict superset of symmetric convex games in the four-agent case. We provide sufficient conditions to identify that class.
Author information
Yuntong Wang
yuntong@uwindsor.caReferences
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Published by Heldermann Verlag, 2007. Rights now held by Banach Press LLC.
