Abstract
In their study of price discrimination for a monopolist selling heterogeneous products to consumers having private information about their own multidimensional types, J.-C. Rochet and P. Choné [Ironing, sweeping, and multidimensional screening, Econometrica 66 (1998) 783–826] discovered a new form of screening in which consumers with intermediate types are bunched together into isochoice groups of various dimensions incentivized to purchase the same product. They analyzed a particular example involving customer types distributed uniformly over the unit square. For this example, we prove that their proposed solution is not selfconsistent, and we indicate how consistency can be restored.
References
- J. Boerma, A. Tsyvinski, A. Zimin: Bunching and taxing multidimensional skills, arXiv: 2204.13481 (2022).https://doi.org/10.3386/w30015Google Scholar
- G. Carlier, T. Lachand-Robert: Regularity of solutions for some variational problems subject to a convexity constraint, Comm. Pure Appl. Math. 54/5 (2001) 583–594.https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3Google Scholar
- I. Ekeland, S. Moreno-Bromberg: An algorithm for computing solutions of variational problems with global convexity constraints, Numer. Math. 115/1 (2010) 45–69.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00211-009-0270-2Google Scholar
- R. J. McCann, K. S. Zhang: A duality and free boundary approach to adverse selection Math. Models Methods Appl. Sci. 34/12 (2024) 2351–2394.https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218202524500507Google Scholar
- J.-M. Mirebeau: Adaptive, anisotropic and hierarchical cones of discrete convex functions, Numer. Math. 132/4 (2016) 807–853.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00211-015-0732-7Google Scholar
- J.-C. Rochet, P. Choné: Ironing, sweeping, and multidimensional screening, Econometrica 66 (1998) 783–826.https://doi.org/10.2307/2999574Google Scholar
Suggested citation
Published by Heldermann Verlag, 2025. Rights now held by Banach Press LLC.
